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Canada was served a wake-up call in 2025 with the United States’ heel turn from regional free trade. More than during his first term, President Trump upended North American trade flows and integrated supply chains with aggressive tariffs on Canadian products. In response, Canadians were called upon to minimize their spending on U.S. goods, like alcohol and food, and buy local instead.
Canadians answered the call—and have stopped travelling to the United States, chosen Canadian products at a premium, and changed their investment decisions. Over and over again, evidence shows Canadians are doing their part in this sensitive moment. What about their governments?
“Buy Canadian” is more than a consumer mantra. It is also a call for governments to make purchases in line with Canadian workers, industry and unions. One in three dollars spent by governments goes to public procurement—the purchase of goods, services and construction work. The federal government alone spends roughly $40 billion each year on contracted work.
This is an industrial lever. Rhetorically, our governments have committed to pulling that lever to support Canadians. The federal government’s Buy Canadian Policy, Ontario’s Buy Ontario Act and New Brunswick’s New Brunswick First Procurement Strategy are three examples.
Rhetoric, however, is easy. But what of the real-world policy action? To answer that question, we must survey federal, provincial and territorial government procurement policies advancing “Buy Canadian.” Where do these policies exist—and how do they navigate harsh trade rules, avoid maple-washing, and mitigate supplier loopholes?
Today, “Buy Canadian” public procurement is more of a performance by government than the substantive industrial policy tool it could be. Only half of the surveyed governments have any real policy at all and only four have a passing grade. The onus to Buy Canadian falls disproportionately on individuals. In other words, our governments are flunking the class.
How governments can fail at buying Canadian
Buy Canadian public procurement involves preferential treatment for suppliers based on their origin and local returns. The theory is that local preferences support domestic employment, minimize transaction cost between governments and their suppliers, and spur growth. Significant data supports this position.
One economic analysis suggests the Buy Canadian movement could add $10 billion to Canada’s gross domestic product (GDP). It is also true that domestic preferences can sometimes increase government expenditures, as critics of the policy warn. However, the point of Buy Canadian policies is not to lower costs but to increase value for money. Buying Canadian offers better value because it minimizes uncertainty and generates downstream benefits.
In a global environment in which international trade dependence is a vulnerability, governments cannot afford to be neutral to the origin of their goods, services or construction work. The short-term savings of always picking the lowest-price supplier carries significant long-term costs.
Until recently, Canadian governments fiercely opposed domestic preferences in public procurement. As recently as 2023, the federal government argued Buy Canadian policies “are unfairly punitive for Canada’s trading partners.” Canada is among a small number of what international trade circles see as procurement restriction maximalists. While most governments refrain from limiting their ability to buy locally in bilateral trade deals and at the World Trade Organization, Canada has voluntarily bound all levels of government—even down to the municipal and school board levels in some agreements.
This expansive coverage is managed through procurement thresholds—the contract value floor at which covered entities must comply with trade rules. Figure 1, below, shows that Canada has relatively low and inconsistent thresholds. In practice, this has made explicit support for Canadian suppliers, like a scoring advantage for Canadian bids (bid preference), difficult.
Policymakers have softened their maximalist position in recent years. The direct threats to Canadian companies and entire sectors from the Trump administration’s trade wars, international supply chain disruptions and competitive economic nationalism has made “procurement localism” attractive. This attraction to buying local is widely shared by the public.
Canada’s trading partners including Europe, Australia, the United Kingdom and Mexico are also warming to procurement localism, which could make them amenable to unorthodox interpretations of existing trade rules. The European Union in particular is leading the way with new local procurement efforts, including its proposed Industrial Accelerator Act and related Buy European measures. This is in addition to the vast majority of EU procurement contracts that are awarded to EU vendors.
Put differently, governments may be able to get away with more industrial strategy than before. In theory, this is exactly what Canadian governments are anticipating.
Navigating international trade commitments is only one hurdle—another is so-called “maple-washing,” or the act of misleadingly labelling something as Canadian even if it is not. For example, supermarkets introduced Canadian labelling schemes to promote products which were made outside of Canada. This maple-washing phenomenon extends to governments, too.
It is easy to advertise an initiative as pro-Canadian without changing procurement behaviour, as the federal government has at least twice. In January, the government claimed the Toronto Transit Commission’s purchase of 55 subway trains was made under the Buy Canadian Policy. In truth, the purchase was not related to the Buy Canadian Policy.
Similarly, in September, the government suggested Via Rail’s purchase of passenger cars was “in line with the Buy Canadian Policy.” This tricky language ignores that the contract was solicited prior to the Buy Canadian Policy’s creation. A functional Buy Canadian Policy generates its own outcomes rather than claiming coincidental Canadian purchases. If Canadians are going out of their way to buy Canadian, then so should their governments.
Policymakers easily maple-wash public procurement because public transparency and awareness is limited. Some jurisdictions in Canada do not offer centralized public contracting data. Among those that do, several governments do not disclose the true origin of their suppliers, so we cannot always be certain if our governments are truly buying Canadian any more than before. This is made all the worse by misleading information.
The federal government’s Spring Economic Update claimed that it had awarded $528 million under the Buy Canadian Policy. This language is technically right but misleading. This value aggregates all policy mentions by solicitation but not whether they had a material impact. We do not know if the policy is changing anything for certain.
Saskatchewan, for its part, claimed that 99 per cent of its procurement already flows to Canadian suppliers. This data would be encouraging if Saskatchewan’s definition of Canadian did not also include so-called mailbox firms—companies from anywhere whose only presence in Canada is a business number and listed address.
Beyond trade rules and maple-washing, domestic spending preferences can still fall flat. Well-meaning procurement policies can fail because global supply chains rarely operate within the boundaries of the nation-state. Multinational corporations, procurement consultants and resellers can skirt new rules through various loopholes.
The most pressing loophole involves defining origin. If our definition of a Canadian or local supplier is too weak, foreign suppliers can “pass” as Canadian while minimally contributing to our economy or workers. This origin loophole is most likely to rear its head when origin is defined too simply, such as by supplier address or “place of business.” Multinational businesses without a Canadian PO box can also shop around for the trade treaty or policy that gives them the best chance in a Canadian procurement competition.
There are three other loopholes worth mentioning. First, domestic suppliers may enable foreign parties to join their bid in a joint venture. This joint venture loophole is open as long as governments consider those foreign parties as “extended origin” because their partner is Canadian. Second, ostensibly domestic suppliers can subcontract their winning public contracts to non-Canadian parties and labour. Third, and similar, domestic suppliers can source foreign products thereby diminishing the downstream value for local workers and the domestic economy. This sourcing loophole is inevitable to some degree, but it can be problematic if not managed. A vendor sourcing non-Canadian dumped steel, for example, not only diminishes local content value but also undercuts a sensitive industry.
Buy Canadian policies or other local preferences can fail for several reasons. International trade rules limit the ambition of these policies, reducing their overall value. Perverse incentives to maintain the status-quo or exaggerate change, like maple-washing, may also minimize the policies’ impacts. Even when government attempts to maximize local economic benefits in public spending are earnest, they can still fall short due to technical loopholes. A passing Buy Canadian Policy must avoid all these pitfalls and more.
The report card
This study examines and ranks current federal, provincial and territorial Buy Canadian measures found in procurement policies, frameworks and legislation supporting local benefits. Local benefits can be pitched as primarily Canadian or within-jurisdiction to count. Indigenous set-asides and preferences were not counted here. These policies are meaningful and valuable but should not be equated to Buy Canadian policies. Buy Indigenous policies merits their own evaluation with Indigenous engagement.
In this exercise, the ideal Buy Canadian Policy is characterized by 15 criteria. A jurisdiction that meets all 15 criteria fully navigates the limits of trade rules, the performance of maple-washing and the four loopholes by which foreign suppliers siphon contract value. Table 1 summarizes each criterion and how they are measured.
These criteria fall into three categories. The first category is the policy’s preference itself. Are Canadian (or local) suppliers advantaged directly or indirectly (content value) and what is that magnitude and coverage?
Buy Canadian policies typically implement these preferences as either a minimum score advantage (bid preference) to a Canadian supplier or a variable advantage based on how much local content (i.e., labour or goods) the contract would use. Ideally, policies should use both preferences and they should account for more than one-tenth of vendors’ scores for procurement decisions—governments typically create such scorecards as part of their procurement process, dispersing points based on a variety of factors including price and vendor reliability. Table 1 shows a purely hypothetical example of a scorecard in which a Canadian vendor wins a contract over their foreign counterpart after Canadian content and origin are factored into their score.
When it comes to purchases based solely on price, the policy instead operationalizes that 10 per cent advantage as a discount on local suppliers’ proposed pricing. For example, in Table 1 if price was the only factor, a 10 per cent discount would allow the Canadian vendor to leapfrog the non-local supplier despite their cheaper proposal. These discounts do not carry forward beyond bid evaluations, meaning local vendors receive their full proposed price.
The question then turns to which purchases the Buy Canadian policy actually covers. Trade rules generally prohibit any discriminatory preferences. As such, governments must either target low-value purchases, which is suboptimal, or use existing trade exceptions. The most common trade exception involves national security. For instance, the Canada-EU Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement (CETA) excepts procurements “indispensable for national security.” Like most treaties, it further makes an exception for procurement necessary to protect “public morals, order or safety” and “human, animal or plant life or health.” These exceptions are vaguely worded, offering an opening for governments to interpret them in their interests. Alternatively, there are also provincial exceptions for regional or rural development under the Canadian Free Trade Agreement (CFTA), although some governments have recently eliminated them in the name of internal trade.
The second category pertains to public disclosure. Does the jurisdiction have a workable data transparency regime? It is vital that data be publicly disclosed, otherwise maple-washing becomes simple. This transparency can include a waiver (exception) system that is transparent. If a government is repeatedly making exceptions on its purchases without scrutiny, the value of Buy Canadian drops.
Finally, the third category captures loopholes. Has the policy navigated each potential loophole? Here, we measure origin twice—once for dealing with physical presence and once for additional criteria around domestic labour and corporate control. Each of the remaining loopholes are allocated one criterion.
Below, the governments are clustered together in order of their scores against these 15 criteria. The exact scores for each government are available in the subsequent appendix.
The achievers: Federal, Manitoba and Northwest Territories
The top tier of governments involve those that have made some effort at creating Buy Canadian policies and navigating some pressing implementation challenges. While imperfect, the federal government, Manitoba, and Northwest Territories are starting in a stronger place than the rest of Canada.
The federal government’s Buy Canadian Policy was introduced in late 2025. The policy (or framework) is comprised of several other policies, an avoidable communications challenge. Of those policies, two stand out among the others: the Policy on Prioritizing Canadian Suppliers and Canadian Content (the supplier policy) and the Policy on Prioritizing Canadian Materials (the materials policy). The former provides two benefits to Canadian suppliers: a 10 per cent bonus to Canadian suppliers for covered procurements, as well as a maximum 25 per cent content value benefit for suppliers based on their domestic contribution.
This policy covers contracts above $5 million in “strategic” areas. The policy’s designers likely specified those areas, like defence and health, in order to anticipate any international trade challenge. Indeed, it appears the federal government is attempting to elicit trade exceptions. This is an ambitious strategy that most governments have avoided. The federal materials policy pertains to sourcing. It requires steel, aluminum and wood product sourcing for contracts above $25 million if they buy enough of those products.
Altogether, the federal government scores an 11 out of 15, or 73 per cent. It is very effective at addressing some loopholes. The policy limits subcontracting through its definition of a Canadian supplier, albeit vaguely. Here, Canadian suppliers cannot routinely subcontract abroad if it results in “minimal” domestic value. Likewise, joint ventures must independently meet the definition of a Canadian supplier. Those suppliers’ sourcing practices are shaped by the materials policy.
The origin loophole, however, remains open—in part because the government has not included any employment or ownership criteria. The federal government also loses points for its disclosure regime, which offers limited vendor description beyond origin and sometimes number of employees. Information on subcontracting and sourcing is imperative to ensure the government does not exaggerate the policy’s impact, which they have appeared to do at times. The government also loses partial marks for its vague waiver conditions. We do not know when or why some procurements are exempted from the framework.
Manitoba’s Buy Canadian Policy is almost identical to the federal government’s. Its definition of origin is nearly the same, although Manitoba further defines origin for both Canadian and Manitoban vendors. Manitoba also makes use of “strategic sectors” language, which means they can cover higher value procurement despite trade commitments. On this front, Manitoba is more aggressive than the federal government. They have included eight strategic sectors that cover much of provincial government spending.
Manitoba provides a 10 price discount for Manitoban vendors for provincial strategic sectors, followed by a five per cent discount for Canadian vendors. Manitoba also includes a 10 per cent preference (operationalized as either one-tenth of a vendor’s evaluation score or a discount on financial proposals). This is less ambitious than the federal government’s 25 per cent and is the primary reason why Manitoba receives a lower score. Manitoba does get credit for specifically targeting Canadian-produced steel, aluminum and wood products in construction.
Manitoba scores 10 out of 15, or 66 per cent. It addresses nearly every loophole in some fashion. Like the federal government, it limits subcontracting and requires joint-ventures to meet origin. It further addresses sourcing through content value preferences and construction inputs. Manitoba loses points for limited engagement with employment or control. It also loses points for a functional but incomplete disclosure regime—Manitoba’s public data does not reveal enough about suppliers and their origin nor does the policy make its exceptions public by default. Last, Manitoba loses two points for capping their preferences at 10 per cent.
The Northwest Territories’ local procurement strategy rivals the federal government’s Buy Canadian Policy. It has three interrelated policies: the Business Incentive Policy (BIP), the NWT Manufactured Products Policy, and the Negotiated Contracts Policy. Summed together, these policies encourage local content advantages for recognized NWT businesses. The bid preference varies by the context. It can reach a maximum of 15 per cent or as little as 0.5 per cent. This advantage covers major contracts. The government may also bypass competitive tendering and instead directly award a contract to local or Indigenous parties if there are material interests at play. The policy also defines origin not only by place of business, but also either by the ownership or location of employees—more comprehensive than most jurisdictions.
Northwest Territories scores 10.5 out of 15, or 70 per cent. It has solid coverage, though is docked points for no minimum Canadian bid preference. Instead, it provides a varying preference depending on content value. The policy has similar data transparency limitations to that of the federal government—once again, the capacity for accountability is deeply limited by the public disclosure regime. It is also unclear how the territorial government allows for exceptions under each policy. Finally, Northwest Territories does not fully close the joint venture and subcontracting loopholes. Direct and indirect free-riding from international vendors remains a risk.
To be clear, neither the federal government nor the Northwest Territories are “over-achievers” but rather “achievers.” Both governments have created a functional policy that will generate some gains for local (or Canadian) suppliers. The actual impact of either policy remains impossible to measure because their accountability frameworks are insufficient. This makes maple-washing very possible.
The improvers: Ontario and Québec
This category features two provinces that have improved their Buy Local procurement efforts over time. Both Ontario and Québec were among the first jurisdictions in Canada to introduce Buy Local procurement initiatives. Indeed, both established their respective policies prior to the present Trump threat. In response to this changed context and perhaps public criticism, these provincial governments have improved their strategies, but the policies remain incomplete.
Ontario’s current suite of policies aims to favour Ontario-based (followed by Canadian) suppliers. The Buy Ontario Act is the latest component of that strategy—a legislative successor to the Building Ontario Businesses Initiative Act (BOBIA). The differences between the two acts are superficial: the Buy Ontario Act now targets municipal procurement where BOBIA did not. The acts, however, were never the substantive component. Instead, it was the policies that followed.
The current policy defines Ontarian and Canadian businesses (beyond supplier address). It also adds social and economic criteria that can “level the playing field” for procurements covered by trade agreements. This is joined by new provincial requirements for capital infrastructure (Capital Infrastructure Policy), the Industrial and Technological Benefits Policy (ITB) and Fleet Vehicle Policy.
In brief, Buy Ontario has come a long way from its original 450-word enabling legislation in 2022. Today, the province scores 8.5 out of 15 in our procurement grading system (57 per cent). It gets full points for its Canadian bid preference, better coverage of trade-covered purchases and definition of origin, which includes employment factors. Where Ontario is failing the most is data collection. Its data disclosure system barely exists through Ontario Tenders, from which it is difficult to pull large data let alone specific vendor details. Ontario also ignores the joint venture loophole, and only indirectly limits subcontracting and sourcing leakages through its infrastructure content value emphasis. The benefit under Buy Ontario is restricted to a bonus 10 per cent on evaluation scores, which is modest.
Québec’s procurement regime is more complicated than Ontario’s. There is no single policy but a set of actions that favour local suppliers. This started with the previous government’s Buy Québec Priority in 2022. At that time, the Québec government introduced a 10 per cent preference for Québec and, after internal trade thresholds, Canadian suppliers. That preference is primarily delivered through content-value assessments and is not necessarily origin exclusive. This value-add preference continues into 2026 with adjustments from recent orders-in-council. Today, some purchases have a 15 per cent content-value bid price discount (e.g., office supplies) while other purchases are exclusive to local suppliers (e.g., some computer products). These adjustments meaningfully expand the scope of Québec’s Buy Local agenda.
Québec scores a nine out of 15, or 60 per cent, which is the third-highest of any province. It stands out for its relatively sophisticated value-add bid adjustments. It also has effective data transparency through SEAO and, better yet, the Open Contracting Partnership platform. This data still misses some vendor information, especially regarding subcontracting and sourcing transparency.
Québec loses most of its points for its poor engagement with procurement loopholes. Its policies do not address any of the loopholes directly. Indirectly, the government’s focus on value-add may mitigate some subcontracting and sourcing.
Some recent orders-in-council are illustrative of these awkward supply chain challenges. For example, the government requires laptops to be purchased from Québec-based suppliers. This category of purchase, however, only requires origin and does not include sourcing. This is likely because Québec does not widely manufacture laptops. So, what does this accomplish? There is a difference between paying a premium for domestic labour and paying a premium for domestic resellers. The latter makes for more attractive topline numbers but little impact.
The tryers: Atlantic Canada
The next category covers provinces that have made some effort to Buy Canadian, often through initiatives that predate the recent fissure in Canada-U.S. relations. That said, the stalling of updates and the lack of policy clarity undermines each attempt.
Of the four Atlantic provinces, New Brunswick may be the most ambitious. New Brunswick first introduced a procurement policy favouring provincial and Canadian suppliers in 2020. This policy—the New Brunswick First Procurement Strategy—has carried over through a change of government, with another update in 2026.
The policy distinguishes between vendors and manufacturers, generally allocating four and five per cent of total evaluation scores respectively. For price-based assessments, the policy applies preferential treatment when the price differential is under 10 per cent. This relatively minor benefit is restricted to low-value purchases below trade thresholds and will have a negligible impact. This is worsened by limited engagement with any potential loopholes. The policy gets modest credit for waiver condition clarity. Still, New Brunswick’s data regime is outdated and offers limited information. Overall, New Brunswick scores 4.5 out of 15 (30 per cent).
Newfoundland and Labrador is very similar to New Brunswick. The provincial government introduced the NL First Procurement Strategy in 2024 to provide a 10 per cent preference to its suppliers. Generally, the policy operates below conventional trade agreement thresholds, which minimizes its impact. Most low-value contracts already flow to local suppliers because they are otherwise unattractive to foreign suppliers.
There are, however, some Canadian Free Trade Agreement (CFTA) exceptions for higher value non-urban procurement in which the policy may apply. The policy undermines this moderate coverage in other ways. For example, the origin loophole is wide open, with only a place-of-business definition. The policy does not address any other loophole at all. It is not backed by a robust transparency regime, either. While the government publishes biweekly contract data, it includes very limited details on vendors. Likewise, the waiver conditions remain unclear. Newfoundland and Labrador scores a four out of 15 (27 per cent).
Nova Scotia theoretically has a policy called Nova Scotia Loyal. Originally announced in 2024, the initiative gestured at a Nova Scotian supplier preference of 10 per cent. The information about this program is very limited. It appears to primarily target contracts below trade thresholds, therefore offering little beyond the status-quo. Without more details, it is unclear if Nova Scotia is navigating any loophole. Nova Scotia does have decent public disclosure and vendor information. In fact, Nova Scotia’s public disclosure is among the best in Canada, although it lacks information on subcontracting for sourcing. Nova Scotia receives a three out of 15 (20 per cent).
Prince Edward Island is similar to Nova Scotia. Under its Procurement of Goods Regulations, PEI offers a 10 per cent preference to its suppliers. There are no content value or offset advantages. The preference strictly applies to low value procurement outside the purview of trade. It does not mitigate any loophole either. PEI’s data regime is slightly below Nova Scotia’s. That is, while there is public disclosure, vendor origin is not readily available and data is not exportable. PEI scores a two out of 15 (13 per cent).
The dissenters: Alberta, Saskatchewan and British Columbia
The westernmost provinces share much in common, including (with the exception of B.C.) an aversion to seriously challenging the United States. Alberta, Saskatchewan and British Columbia have also all entirely disengaged with Buy Local procurement policies. None of the provinces provide any advantage to their local suppliers. In the case of Alberta and Saskatchewan, they even have been resistant to banning American suppliers from their procurement. B.C. has at least been more engaged on that front. Yet, the very fact B.C. has been vocal about fighting the Trump administration makes their laggard status all the more curious.
All three provinces have passable data coverage, which accounts for the 1.5 out of 15 (10 per cent) score each province receives here. Saskatchewan uses SaskTenders, which offers basic information though not readily exportable for analysis. Alberta uses Purchasing Connection, which has award notices dating back to 2024, but otherwise no single dataset. There is, however, a dataset on sole-service contracts. British Columbia has BC Bid, which has some general but non-exportable information, and a “Ministry Contract Awards” dataset. Even with these datasets, it is difficult to discern larger trends or vendor activity. Even for those who prefer open and competitive procurement, this is problematic because it means vendor’s anti-competitive practices (e.g., trojan horse bidding) can escape public scrutiny.
The undetermined: Yukon and Nunavut
Neither Yukon nor Nunavut has seriously engaged with Buy Canadian or an equivalent territorial policy. Much like the Western provinces, these territorial governments do not strategically use public procurement in that way. That said, Yukon’s and Nunavut’s public procurement environments are unique. Not only are they smaller jurisdictions with far fewer options for vendors, but they are also disproportionately populated by Indigenous (Inuit) peoples. In that regard, both territories have Indigenous procurement policies that may go much further than other jurisdictions in actually preferring local companies and parties. As such, it would be unfair to treat them as equal to other jurisdictions. At best, these territories may be well placed to learn from the Northwest Territories in refining their procurement regimes.
A path forward
The call to Buy Canadian has been unevenly answered. While Canadians have clearly done their part, their governments have generally fallen behind. As this analysis revealed, only four of the 14 governments scored a passing grade. Even the best Buy Canadian policy to date is marred by international trade exposure, maple-washing and procurement loopholes. Still, even some effort can go a long way. On that front, three provinces and two territories offer no Buy Local or Canadian policy whatsoever.
The regionalization of procurement practices is a notable finding itself. Beyond the federal government and Manitoba, central provinces like Ontario and Québec are advancing more ambitious policies than their provincial counterparts. Atlantic Canadian provinces all have similar outcomes: minor preferences that are minimally institutionalized. Governments of the Western provinces (save Manitoba) have made almost zero effort to enact Buy Canadian policies. The Territories are unique because their international obligations are different and their vendor options are inherently limited. Still, Northwest Territories shows Buy Canadian policies are achievable despite these limitations. This may suggest isolated cross-jurisdictional learning is taking place. If so, governments and senior public servants would be well placed to expand their survey nation-wide.
Still, it must be reiterated that no jurisdiction comes close to a perfect score. There is plenty of room for improvement across the board. The most consequential area is data transparency. Canadians know very little about what their governments are buying. At the very least, governments should be expected to host publicly available datasets on public websites. Public procurement data should not be relegated to third-party platforms. Beyond that, our basic information on vendors and their origin must be precise and detailed enough to measure a policy’s success. Without this data, it is far too easy to exaggerate Buy Canadian public procurement.
Canadians are making sacrifices, and so must their governments. The current global climate demands responses we once deemed unnecessary or undesirable. Our trading partners have made the choice to buy into Buy Local. Ideological disposition notwithstanding, Canada must do the same. We must Buy Canadian and support Canadian workers with each and every dollar we can.
