Canadians have put a lot of trust in Mark Carney’s professed skills at investment promotion and sound economic management. Indeed, the government’s core objective is to hit the big-sounding, but essentially arbitrary, target of $1 trillion in new private, institutional and foreign investment in Canada over the next five years. 

The government seems less concerned with where that money actually gets spent (if it comes). The funding target is not tied to any coherent industrial policy, and there is a concerning emphasis on export-oriented fossil fuel infrastructure, high-risk and high-cost nuclear energy projects, non-productive defence spending, and the privatization of public assets like air and marine ports. 

Equally, and perhaps more, worryingly in this race for global capital is how the federal and provincial governments are taking apart their own ability to set terms on new investment through public interest regulation. A new Treasury Board Secretariat directive on regulation across all departments is a clear and dangerous case in point. 

New red tape for regulators

Some ideas are so bad they are actually deadly, but refuse to die themselves. ”Red tape reduction” as the core principle behind good regulatory practice is a perfect example. 

Ottawa’s recently released Cabinet Directive on Regulatory Competitiveness and Red Tape Reduction aims to reorient how government departments set new rules affecting business, with the key aim of reducing regulatory “burden.” When developing new rules, departments are now expected to:

  1. Consider not regulating at all unless there is a clear public interest goal (which there usually is).
  2. Undertake and communicate an assessment of the potential impacts of new rules on competitiveness (which is not defined in the directive, and not what regulation is for).
  3. Offset $2 for every $1 increase in regulatory burden on business (also not clearly defined) over a three-year period.
  4. Consider adopting foreign or international standards rather than developing unique rules for a potentially unique (legally, politically or geographically) Canadian situation.
  5. Review new rules with significant economic impacts every five years (not a bad idea) to make sure they’re working as intended.
  6. Remove outdated or inactive regulations as soon as possible (which has the equivalent effect on regulatory burden of going to inbox zero—none).

Number 3 on that list (the $2 for $1 rule) is especially pernicious. These sorts of two-for-one rules for regulatory management have been widely adopted in Canada and internationally, frequently with disastrous results. The rule follows a model adopted by the U.S. government at the beginning of the first Trump administration. The measure was widely criticized as a threat to public health and safety, and the environment.

Although the directive only loosely defines the concept of “regulatory burdens,” these types of rules are intended to require that existing regulatory requirements be removed or substantively weakened before any new requirements can be established. 

The implication is that governments cannot address new problems unless they remove a rule related to a previously established threat. Governments cannot adopt stronger rules for air pollution, for example, unless they somehow weaken the rules around some other threat to human health or the environment, such as the management of hazardous wastes. 

More insidiously, these requirements impose an analytical burden on regulators, which makes them less likely to propose new rules, even when officials are aware of the need to address emerging threats to health, safety, and the environment. 

Ironically, given the ambiguity of terms like “burden” and “competitiveness,” regulators may also be able to justify any amount of additional cost (on business). The directive has a performative aspect that is destined to annoy the businesses it is meant to cater to, all the while leaving Canadians less confident in government.

Ignoring the warning signs

There are numerous fatal examples of the perverse impacts of these sorts of “regulatory management” rules. In his report on the May 2000 Walkerton Water Disaster in Ontario, in which contaminated drinking water killed seven people and made thousands seriously ill, Justice Dennis O’Connor highlighted the role of similar “red tape reduction” rules in contributing to the disaster and its severity.

In the United Kingdom, the existence of a “one in, two out” rule, similar to that in the new federal regulatory directive, was strongly implicated in the Grenfell tower fire in 2017. Regulatory authorities in the U.K. failed to revise fire safety codes to address the threats posed by the types of building cladding used in some new apartment builds, resulting in the deaths of more than 70 people.

These types of rules effectively embed a regulatory “freeze” where it becomes impossible to respond to new threats, while also deterring officials from updating existing rules even where it may be possible or appropriate to do so. At a minimum there needs to be an exemption for regulations or instruments necessary for the protection of the health, safety, and environment of Canadians. 

Canada could achieve this by embedding the precautionary principle—better safe than sorry—at the heart of regulatory policy. Such a model exists, imperfectly, in the European Union and other jurisdictions with a better track record for protecting the public from harmful business practices. In contrast, Canadian regulators seem to operate on the principle that the best government is the government that governs least.

Making things worse, the new directive on regulatory burden fundamentally misunderstands the role of governments in the protection of public goods. Regulatory regimes around transportation, food and drugs, water, employment health and safety, consumer products, pesticides and other agricultural inputs, hazardous or toxic chemicals and materials, and natural resources and the environment are supposed to balance private interests (profit) with the public interest.  

When policymakers ask regulators to set rules in ways that enhance competitiveness (profits), they erode (if not obliterate) that balance. Whether you label this irresponsible way of regulating “agile” or “responsive,” it is an abdication of good government, not its refinement. 

Someone is going to get hurt

Canadian business lobbies repeatedly claim they would invest more in new production if there were fewer burdensome federal and provincial regulations in their way. Governments pander to these concerns with endless “red tape reduction” plans and by watering down public protections, with no noticeable effect on investment. This triggers new calls to deregulate, further government acquiescence, still no investment, and the cycle continues. 

With each kick at the “red tape” can, Canadian workers and consumers are made less safe for no good reason. It should be apparent to governments by now that deregulation is not a significant driver of productive, sustainable investment. Businesses follow the money and will navigate reasonable public protections, including project impact assessments, where there is a decent chance of returns on their investment. Public protections are a normal cost of doing business. 

Stuart Trew

Stuart serves as director of the CCPA’s Trade and Investment Research Project (TIRP), which pools the expertise of academic, labour and non-governmental organization researchers to understand the impacts of trade and investment treaties and policy on the Canadian economy, public services, human rights and international relations.

Mark Winfield

Mark Winfield is Professor of Environmental and Urban Change at York University and the co-chair of the faculty's Sustainable Energy Initiative.