This week, 25 former Ecuadorian cabinet ministers and former presidents of the national assembly sent a letter to Canada’s International Trade Minister Maninder Sidhu about the Canada–Ecuador Free Trade Agreement, signed in July and pending ratification in both countries. The politicians request that Canada remove the investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS) sections of Chapter 15 (Investment) before tabling implementing legislation of the deal. 

ISDS is the controversial legal tool with which corporations and investors can challenge governments’ laws and regulations through international arbitration rather than domestic courts. Supporters of ISDS, like Canada, claim it creates legal certainty for overseas investors, but too often it is used as a weapon to deter, or seek punitive financial compensation for, the imposition of policies that directly or only inadvertently affect an investor’s returns (profits).  

Governments have been moving away from ISDS in recent years in order to strengthen their ability to regulate business activities with potential risks to people or the planet and to avoid costly and frequently outrageous corporate challenges. Canada, on the other hand, has been pushing hard for the inclusion of ISDS in its free trade agreements, including with Ecuador. 

The letter to Minister Sidhu from the former Ecuadorian politicians, a copy of which was shared with the CCPA, raises critical legal reasons why this is a problem beyond normative concerns about how undemocratic and environmentally foolhardy ISDS is in practice. Four points stand out. 

The first is constitutional. Article 422 of Ecuador’s constitution prohibits the government from entering into treaties that cede jurisdiction over disputes with private companies to international arbitration. The letter to Sidhu notes that Ecuador’s constitutional court applied that article to strike down the arbitration provisions of Ecuador’s agreement with Costa Rica in 2023. The same court reversed itself this March, by seven votes to two, but only “in the course of a sustained campaign against the Court by the executive.”

President Daniel Noboa, who has driven his country into authoritarianism over two short years, led a march on the court in 2025, put the faces of self-declared enemy justices on billboards, audited six of the nine justices and pursued criminal inquiries into two of them. All of this drew a warning from the United Nations special rapporteur on judicial independence, and a report by NYU’s Rule of Law Lab. “The constitutional pathway on which Chapter 15 depends now rests on a ruling delivered under these conditions,” notes the letter to Sidhu.

The second point is democratic. In an April 2024 referendum, Ecuadorians were asked whether to amend Article 422 of the constitution to allow for treaty-based arbitration; 65 per cent of voters said no. In November 2025 the Noboa government tried again, asking in a second plebiscite whether a constituent assembly should be formed to re-write the constitution; almost 62 per cent said no. The population is clearly against ISDS, yet Ecuador and Canada are stubbornly trying to wedge it back into Ecuadorian life, mainly to the benefit of Canadian mining companies.

Canada opened free trade negotiations with Ecuador eight days after the first anti-ISDS vote and signed an agreement after the second. As the Ecuadorian politicians note, “a treaty obligation that two national votes have declined to authorize is not a sound foundation for a long-term economic relationship between our countries.”

The third important point is that Canada saw this coming. The signatories quote Canada’s own negotiating objectives, tabled in the House of Commons a month before the 2024 referendum, which flagged Ecuador’s constitutional constraints. According to the government, the investment provisions “may be set aside, in part or entirely.”

Ecuador’s agreements with the European Union, the United Kingdom, China and, since March, the United States contain no investor–state dispute settlement. “Among Ecuador’s trade agreements,” the letter observes, “Canada’s is the one that retains it.”

The fourth point is more technical and relates to some sloppy circular reasoning in the investment chapter that was probably aimed at pulling a fast one on the Ecuadorian courts.

While partially reversing its firm position against ISDS in the Costa Rica decision of 2023, the court’s decision this year on a UAE-Ecuador investment treaty nonetheless demanded the agreement be amended to exclude contractual or commercial disputes between Ecuador and private persons from international arbitration. The Canada-Ecuador FTA responds to this decision in a strange way.

Footnote 12 of Chapter 15 declares that claims under the chapter are not “contractual or commercial,” to satisfy Ecuador’s court, while Article 15.36.6 of the same chapter declares that every such claim “shall be considered to arise out of a commercial relationship or transaction,” to satisfy Canada’s ISDS enforcement rules under the New York Convention. As the Ecuadorian politicians note, “These are statements about the same disputes, in the same instrument, thirteen articles apart. We do not think both can be sustained.”

Canada regularly invokes the rule of law in public declarations and statements. G7 communiqués routinely express a desire to advance democracy and defend against authoritarianism, and the important role of judicial systems “free from corrupt influence or coercion” in that effort. “Commitments of this kind mean little unless they hold when keeping them is inconvenient,” say the Ecuadorian former ministers, “and keeping them here would have cost Canada nothing more than an investment chapter it had already said it could do without.”

Canada removed investor–state arbitration from its own relationship with the United States in 2018. Former deputy prime minister Chrystia Freeland stated the move enhanced Canadian democracy and made it easier to regulate in the public interest. The Trudeau and then Carney governments almost immediately started to contradict this truthful and principled position by signing new investment and free trade treaties that include ISDS—because that’s what Canada-based mining companies want them to do.

The problem for Ecuador and other Canadian trade “partners” is that nobody else’s rights are given any shrift in these agreements. The government is moving backwards on human rights (including labour rights) and environmental protection—at home, through deregulation, and abroad, by removing labour enforcement mechanisms in new trade agreements—while forcing antidemocratic investment protection regimes onto unsuspecting and, in Ecuador’s case, unwilling populations.

Six weeks before signing a free trade deal with Ecuador, Ottawa abolished the Canadian Ombudsperson for Responsible Enterprise, the one federal office that heard human rights and environmental complaints against Canadian mining companies abroad. Canadian investment in Ecuador tripled in the five years after the previous Canada–Ecuador investment treaty was terminated.

The investment chapter in the new free trade deal protects no Canadian interest that needs protecting. It extends to Canadian-registered companies, whoever owns them, a remedy Canada declined for itself, against a partner whose constitution forbids it and whose voters have said so twice.

This week’s letter to Minister Sidhu should be read by all MPs in Parliament. Implementing legislation for the Ecuador deal, when it comes, will ask MPs to enact Chapter 15 as written. They should ask the government the questions the former Ecuadorian ministers have asked, starting with the simplest: why is Canada the only one of Ecuador’s trading partners that insisted on this?